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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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The development of corporate bond markets has been 
constrained in many emerging economies, partly because 
the regulatory model is implicitly designed for stand-
alone public offerings. Corporate bonds are intrinsically 
more suitable for non-retail investors than for retail 
investors. Nonetheless, the prevailing regulatory model 
puts an excessive emphasis on disclosure and investor 
protection as well as government oversight, regardless 
of targeted investors. Such a non-differentiating 
This paper—a product of the Capital Markets Division, Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Department—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to assist member countries in developing the capital market for their economic 
development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may 
be contacted at tendo@worldbank.org.  
regulatory approach disconnects issuers from investors 
by considerably raising opportunity costs to issuers. 
Broadening the choice of offering methods would lower 
corporate bond issuance costs, thereby allowing more 
issuers to finance their investments with bond issues. 
Additional forms of offerings are traditional private 
placements, institutional offerings, and shelf registration 
facilitated by integrated disclosure.  
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  21.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative to the currently prevailing 
model for developing the corporate bond market in emerging markets. The prevailing model 
has placed too much emphasis on public bond markets and too little emphasis on more 
flexible offering methods, including private placements. The issuer’s opportunity costs 
associated with public offerings keep the corporate bond market from gaining momentum for 
development. The efficiency of the primary market matters more to corporate bond market 
development than that of the secondary market. 
Broadening the offering methods of corporate bonds would help invigorate the 
development of the corporate bond market. Despite its strongly advocated role in economic 
development, the corporate bond market remains marginal at best in most emerging 
economies (Table 1.1). Impediments are often found in the macroeconomic environment, the 
legal system, the financial regime, the regulatory regime, the tax regime, the corporate 
governance, the market infrastructure, and the structure of the financial industry. In 
addressing these problems in a particular country, most efforts have been implicitly confined 
to the market of stand-alone public offerings. In contrast, advanced markets have long 
embraced a broader choice of offering methods—including traditional private placements, 
institutional offerings, and shelf registration—that are complementary to stand-alone public 
offerings (Figure 1.1).
1 These additional methods are likely to catalyze the development of 
the corporate bond market because they are cost-effective in reaching mainstream investors 
in corporate bonds. 
An expected virtuous cycle for the corporate bond market has yet to materialize in 
many emerging markets. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s prompted policy makers 
to assume that the corporate bond market would help supply long-term debt capital in a 
sound and efficient manner.
2 The corporate bond market was also expected to supply debt 
                                                 
1 Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) looked at a sample of 297 U.S. non-finance companies that 
had a firm size exceeding US$100 million as of year-end 1986 and that were likely to have access to both 
private and public debt markets. For a typical firm in that sample, more than 60 percent of all its long-term debt 
was privately placed from 1987 to 1993. 
2 Hakansson (1999) argues the merits of a well-developed corporate bond market in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis. 
  3Table   1.1: Equities, Bonds, and Bank Loans Compared to Nominal GDPs 
in Selected Developing and Industrial Countries 
As of December 2007
+
GDP)





(U.S. dollars in billions, % of 
Savings 
(Dec. 2006)  Total bond Government bon Corporate bo
Equ
(Dec. 2




(Dec. 2006)  Amount  % of GDP  t  P n D u D o o  GDP  Amoun % of GD   Amou t  % of G P  Amo nt  % of G P  Am unt  % of GDP  Am unt  % of
Argentina  214.2 61.4 28.6  7 .4 5.9 62.0 33.8 18.8 10.3 75. 35 63.1 29.4 12.7
Brazil  1,067.5 210.3 19.7  2 .2 4.1 8.1 24.2 50.1  51.0 332.1 37.6 952. 89 69 65.0 25 4  
Chile  145.8 51.0 34.9  7 .3 19.3 74.2 62.4 42. 29 14.5 10.0 28.2 131.8  110.9 
Mexico  839.2 173.4 20.7  4 .3 1.6 3.8 19.5 06.7  26.9 129.1 16.8 355. 42 19 22.8 16 2  
Peru    92.4 26.8 29.0  1 .9 4.6 5.0 28.5 35.9 14.3 18.1 22. 23 17.5 18.9
Bolivia 11.2  2.4 21.9  na na na na na 2.1  22.6  3.6 38.2 na
Colombia  153.4 32.3 21.1  2 .1 0.8 0.5 36.0 29.2 27.4 22.3 52. 34 51.4 33.5
India  911.8 283.2 31.1  4 .3 6.9 4.6 72.6  71.1 297.1 36.9 458. 50 41 45.7 41.5 5  
Indonesia 364.8  107.1 29.4  0 .1 9.3 2.5 77.9  27.2  66.0 23.0 88. 24 78.7 21.6
Korea 888.0  274.3 30.9  5 .7 6.0 1.5 72.2 73.2  995.4 125.8 1,107. 124 46 52.5 64 579.1 
Malaysia 150.7  56.8 37.7  6 .5 8.9 72.3 88.3 44.0 165.6 126.6 178. 118 69.7 46.2 10 1   1  
Philippines    117.6 15.4 13.1  2 .1 1.6 1.3 34.8 35.4 30.1 30.6 54. 46 52.6 44.8
Thailand 206.3  65.6 31.8  0 .9 20.0 20.3  68.2 159.6 90.5 136. 65 94.7 45.9 41.3 1  
Czech Rep.  143.0  43.2 30.2  4 .0 13.6 35.3  28.5  41.0 33.1 104. 73 84.9 59.4 19.5
Hungary  112.9 28.9 25.6  1 .1 6.6 5.8 31.2 28.3 53.0 48.0 70. 62 63.5 56.2
Poland 338.7  66.4 19.6  6 .0 2.6 na na 84.2  27.8  79.7 26.3 162. 48 16 48.0
Slovakia  55.0 13.4 24.3  0 .6 na na 4.5  9.6 15.0 31.7 19. 34 19.0 34.6
Russia   986.9  324.5 32.9  6 4.1 na na 72.5  173.5 22.7 40. 4.1 40.6 554.2 
South Africa  255.2  43.5 17.1  7 .3 19.0 160.5 66.3 120. 47 72.2 28.3 48.5 518.4  214.1 
U.S.* 13,163.9  1,677.6 13.5  8 .7 0.6 3.2 34 57.8 3 952.9 184.9 24,313. 184 6,59 50.1 17,72 1 .6 16,7   1 5.0  22,
Japan*  4,368.4 1,126.2 24.8  7 .7 5.1 3.6 0.7 39.2 10.3 06 440.6 97.9 8,855. 202 7,14 16 1,71 4,8   1 .1 4,
U.K. 2,377.0  322.7 13.6  0 .2 3.0 6.0 19.2 74.5 416.4 155.2 1,359. 57 90 38.0 45 2,9   135.1  3,
Germany 2,896.9  671.9 23.2  6 .8 3.0 6.6 42.7 24.6  43 103.3 111.0 2,629. 90 1,39 48.1 1,23 1,2 .8  3,
Sources: BIS Quarterly Review June 2008, World Development Indicators, World Bank Financial Sector Development Indicators, staff calculation. 
Notes: 
1. na = not available 
2. GDP figures are nominal and taken from the World Bank Database, World Development Indicators. 
3. Savings are from the World Bank Database, World Development Indicators. 
4. Bonds are those in local currency taken from BIS Quarterly Review June 2008. Corporate bonds include those by financial institutions and corporate issuers, except for Colombia and th
Philippines. Bonds as a percentage of GDP are estimated based on nominal GDP for 2006. 
investment products in local currencies to medium- and long-term investors, including 
contractual savings institutions. Efficient matching of demand and supply would generally 
reduce funding costs, increase investment yields, and minimize refinancing as well as 
reinvestment risks. The transferability of corporate bonds in the secondary market would 
reduce funding costs by lowering a liquidity premium. Thus, lessening maturity mismatches 
on the balance sheets of banks and contractual savings institutions would reduce systemic 
risk and increase financial efficiency in the economy through the efficient reallocation of 
debt capital. However, this scenario has not occurred thus far in many emerging economies. 
e 
aims could 
5. Equities are those in local currency taken from the World Bank Database, World Bank Financial Sector Indicator. 
6. Bank claims on the private sector are from the World Bank Database, World Bank Financial Sector Indicator. Bank claims are the closest available proxy for bank loans, although cl
also include other claims, such as equity securities. Bank claims on the private sector are taken here as approximations for loans to the private sector. 
+ As of December 2006 for GDP and Savings, except for U.S. and Japan (*as of December 2005 for Savings). As of December 2005 for Equities and Bank claims. 
 
Corporate bond market development has long focused on the market of stand-alone 
public offerings, overlooking hidden opportunity costs. In many emerging markets, the 
corporate bond market implies the market of stand-alone public offerings. Most regulatory 
efforts have been directed at enforcing the best possible disclosure for stand-alone public 
offerings. As a result, the overemphasis on stand-alone public offering norms has been 
making corporate bond issuance in emerging economies unnecessarily cumbersome and time 
consuming, compared with issuance of bank loans. The time-consuming nature of financing 
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with corporate bonds in emerging economies substantially increases opportunity costs to the 
borrower. Opportunity costs in stand-alone offerings have been significantly responsible for 
keeping corporate bond markets marginal, at best, in most developing economies. 
Gearing the primary market policy more toward non-retail investors is likely to 
accommodate corporate bond market development in emerging economies. The primary 
market and non-retail investors are the two pillars of a corporate bond market. However, little 
policy research has been done on the efficiency of the primary market of corporate bonds, let 
alone that in emerging markets.
3 A better understanding of the primary market and non-retail 
investors, especially institutional investors, would likely help moderate the overemphasis on 
the norms for stand-alone public offerings in corporate bond market development.  
This paper is intended to provide policy makers, regulators, and other stakeholders of 
emerging economies with a policy impetus toward corporate bond market development. The 
rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on corporate bond 
market development in developing economies. Section 3 analyzes the characteristics of 
                                                 
3 Friedman and Grose (2006) examine legal and regulatory measures that can be taken to promote access to the 
primary market of equities in emerging market economies, including private placements. 
  5corporate bonds. Section 4 explores the rationales for modification of regulatory focus in 
corporate bond market development. Section 5 examines the three alternative offering 
methods. The final section summarizes the preceding discussions. 
2.  Literature on the Primary Market for Corporate Bonds 
Far less policy research has been done on corporate bond market development in 
emerging economies than on government debt markets. Discussion of corporate bond 
markets tends to be supplementary to that on government debt markets in the literature on 
emerging fixed-income markets. Publications by international organizations extensively 
review the structure and practices of emerging debt markets or those of advanced markets for 
policy makers in emerging markets (see, for example, BIS 2002; IOSCO 2002; OECD 2002; 
World Bank 2001). An increasing number of research papers, including the foregoing, have 
deepened development institutions’ understanding of emerging corporate bond markets in 
individual countries or regions by documenting these markets’ characteristics and roles (see, 
for example, Aguilar and others 2006; Akamatsu 2005; Batten, Fetherston, and Szilagyi 
2003; BIS 2001, 2002, 2007; Bose and Coondoo 2003, Braun and Briones 2006; Castellanos 
and Martínez 2006; de Brun and others 2006; De la Torre and Schmukler 2007; Fernández 
and others 2006; FOA 2005; IOSCO 2005; Jiang and McCauley 2004; Kim, Ho, and St Giles 
2003; Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva 2006; Marathe 2006; Mirkin and Lebedeva 2006, Park 
and Kim 2004; Rand Merchant Bank 2001; Reininger, Schardax, and Summer 2002; Scott 
and Ho 2004; Sy 2007). Most of them report that, compared with bank loan markets and 
government bond markets, corporate bond markets are underdeveloped in emerging countries 
or regions.  
Meanwhile, studies on impediments to market development paid attention to the 
structure of emerging economies. Sharma (2000) indicates that the close and interlocking 
links between banks, companies, and governments in Southeast Asia are impeding corporate 
bond market development. Similarly, Dickie and Fan (2005) and IMF (2005) point out some 
bank resistance to corporate bond market development. BIS (2007) also identifies inadequate 
reliable information (which is partly due to weak corporate governance), a narrow investor 
base, and competition from commercial banks as impediments to corporate bond market 
development. Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee (2008) show that smaller firms, even with their 
  6better corporate governance structures, were unable to access the new capital markets when 
banks stopped lending in the Republic of Korea. As for Latin American countries, 
Borensztein, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2006: 20) reveal that the corporate bond market 
tends to be large in countries with less efficient banking sectors
4 and in “countries with the 
English legal code.”
5 Fernández, Pernice, and Streb (2007) attribute small company and 
economy sizes to the underdevelopment of the corporate bond market in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, and Peru. 
Efforts to look into market microstructure have also begun. Zervos (2004) documents 
issuance cost information in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and IMF (2005) reviews issuance 
costs by management fees, registration, listing fees, and legal fees; credit rating fees; 
marketing costs; and taxes. Luengnaruemitchai and Ong (2005) argue that the high costs 
associated with corporate debt issuance have significantly deterred market development. 
These studies seem to have two limitations. First, the issuance costs that they refer to are 
limited to accounting costs but do not include opportunity costs of corporate bond issues as 
compared with bank loans. Opportunity costs count a lot in the issuer’s choosing a financing 
option, as is shown later in this paper. Second, the corporate bond issues that they studied 
were stand-alone public offerings. Policy makers, regulators, and other market stakeholders 
need to view the potential for market development more broadly. Roldos (2004) sheds some 
light on the effect of the issuance process on market development, citing the underwriting 
process of 60 days in Brazil and the cost-effectiveness of private placements in Poland.  
3.  Characteristics of Corporate Bonds 
Primary market efficiency significantly determines the activity level of a corporate 
bond market because corporate bonds are exposed to market forces mainly in the primary 
market rather than in the secondary market. The low liquidity of corporate bonds relative to 
government bonds is well known. Most corporate bonds cannot fully satisfy the attributes 
necessary for their secondary market liquidity. When regulatory and incentive frameworks 
are properly put in place, institutional investors prefer higher yields at acceptable risk over 
liquidity for a substantial part of their medium- and long-term investment portfolios. 
                                                 
4 These countries have high banking spreads and high levels of bank concentration. 
5 That is, countries with common law legal systems. 
  7Clarifying those intrinsic characteristics of corporate bonds would help improve the 
regulatory framework and market structure for corporate bonds in line with emerging market 
realities. 
3.1  Lack of Liquidity Attributes 
Corporate bonds lack the attributes necessary for secondary market liquidity. To keep 




8 and transparent manner in a competitive 
environment. In addition, government bonds are usually the most creditworthy in a country. 
By contrast, corporate issuers cannot satisfy most of these attributes in their bond issues. 
Corporate issuers usually have little economic incentive to care about the secondary market. 
Large financial institutions, utility companies, and some state-owned enterprises may be 
exceptions. They may be able to meet some of the attributes to gain some liquidity in the 
secondary market because they raise substantial funds frequently, regularly, or both.  
3.2  Market Windows 
Investors and issuers often use corporate bonds to meet their medium- to long-term 
needs. Specific investment and financing needs face investors and issuers under ever-
changing business environments and financial market conditions. Investors differ in 
investment objectives, preferences, capacities, and constraints, including tax and accounting 
considerations. An internal or external event could impact investors’ portfolios differently 
and investors may react to the impact differently. The differences will likely create a short-
lived opportunity for issuers to exploit particular types of investors (a market window). Some 
investors may be willing to pay a premium if the timing or features of a debt product satisfy 
their particular needs. Conversely, issuers will also be faced with unique or markedly distinct 
                                                 
6 Issuing practices and admission criteria to automated trading systems like MTS in highly or reasonably liquid 
markets suggest that the issue size necessary for the targeted liquidity is approximately US$5 billion or more in 
the French, German, Japanese, and U.S. markets; US$3 billion in the Dutch and Portuguese markets; US$1.5 
billion in the South African market; US$1.3 billion in the Singaporean market; US$1.1 billion in the Thai 
market; and US$0.5 billion to US$0.8 billion in the Malaysian market. 
7 The government may impose limits on auction allocations; may privately place bonds with a particular group 
of investors; or may, under a primary dealer system, appoint foreign dealers as primary dealer. 
8 The debt management office or its equivalent usually provides “issuance calendars.” 
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funding needs from time to time. They may consequently wish to pay some premium for the 
fulfillment of those requirements.  
Investors and issuers achieve their returns or costs on corporate bonds by capturing 
market windows opportunistically in the primary market. After investors have bought 
corporate bonds on the primary market or on the secondary market immediately following 
the issuance, those bonds are seldom available for sale in the secondary market. Therefore, 
investors have the best chance to achieve their desired returns on a large block of corporate 
bond investment through market windows in the primary market. Most market windows for 
issuers or investors tend to be brief. In an efficient primary market, investors compete with 
each other for a finite set of opportunities offered by issuers. The same holds true for issuers. 
In such a market, both issuers and investors can and should be able to issue or invest on short 
notice, which creates primary market efficiency (Figure 3.1).  
  9 
Figure   3.2: Liquidity Assets and Yield-Seeking Assets in an Investment Portfolio 
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3.3  Buy and Hold 
The “buy and hold” strategy, which is often viewed as responsible for the low 
liquidity of corporate bonds, is rational to many institutional investors. On many occasions, 
institutional investors are likely to achieve their investment objectives better by not trading 
corporate bonds frequently. 
Most institutional investors do not need to keep a large part of their portfolio liquid. 
Only a small part of a portfolio may flow out on demand or with a short notice.
9 A 
substantial part of the liabilities of institutional investors is medium or long term, or both. 
Therefore, assets that they hold for liquidity purposes (liquidity assets) can be relatively 
small
10 (Figure 3.2). In addition, they are usually able to fund temporary shortfalls in the 
                                                 
9 An exception is open-end mutual funds. They keep a larger part of their portfolios liquid to meet their unit-
holders’ redemption requests than other institutional investors do. 
10 The actual size of this illiquid component varies and fluctuates, depending on investment objectives, 
restrictions, outlook for market conditions, and other factors.  
  10market or from banks, if such shortfalls occur. Consequently, most institutional investo
investing in corporate bonds can hold the bonds for a long period or t
rs 
o maturity. 
                                                
The investor would be better off investing illiquid funds in higher-yielding assets 
(yield-seeking assets) to the extent that its risk-tolerance parameters permit it to forgo 
liquidity. Corporate bonds are less liquid and riskier than government bonds, but they yield 
higher returns than government bonds. Choosing high-quality issuers, conducting thorough 
due diligence, structuring issues in a legally robust manner, and diversifying a portfolio 
mitigate risks associated with investments. Institutional investors are usually resourceful 
enough to take these risk-mitigating measures. 
The low liquidity of corporate bonds, in turn, reinforces institutional investors’ buy-
and-hold behavior. Bid-ask spreads, if any, are wide in a less liquid market. Selling a large 
block of corporate bonds would have an adverse market impact,
11 widening the bid-ask 
spread. Consequently, selling less liquid bonds in the secondary market would significantly 
lower their realized rate of return compared to their yield to maturity at the time of purchase. 
Institutional investors thus trade corporate bonds only when their trading needs justify large 
trading costs. 
3.4  Credit Risk 
Credit risk also distinguishes investing in corporate bonds from investing in 
government bonds. The investor can address the credit risk of corporate bonds in two phases: 
how to assess and mitigate the likelihood of default on bonds (ex ante credit risk) and how to 
assess and maximize the likelihood of recovery of defaulted bonds (ex post credit risk). Most 
events of default on bonds occur when the issuer goes bankrupt or, if the bonds are 
guaranteed, when both the issuer and the guarantor go bankrupt.  
The investor controls ex ante credit risk through elaborate credit analysis, thorough 
due diligence, diversified investment, and restrictive covenants. To choose quality issuers, 
the investor relies on the issuer’s self-evident factors, such as its size, profitability, 
 
11 A market impact is the effect of the positions bought or sold on the price paid or received for a security. If an 
order lot is large relative to the actual liquidity, the order will be executed only at a price low or high enough to 
meet the required volume of demand for or supply of the security. The difference between the executed and 
initially quoted prices is called the market impact or price impact. Market impact is often the largest component 
of trading cost for a large transaction and for a large investor. 
  11experience in the debt market, leverage and coverage ratios, and credit rating (if any). Due 
diligence allows the investor and the intermediary to verify the issuer’s mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure and, if necessary, to demand additional disclosure. Setting and enforcing 
strict or specific covenants requires the investor and the intermediary to have bargaining and 
monitoring capacities. Diversifying the investment portfolio limits the investor’s investment 
in a particular issuer, industry segment, or geographic area. These preventive measures are 
too costly for individual investors to take unless the issuer is listed on an exchange, complies 
with ongoing disclosure, or is credit rated. Listing, ongoing disclosure, and credit rating may 
not be economical for the issuer unless it issues bonds in a large amount, and frequently, or 
both. 
The investor attempts to manage ex post credit risk by securing its claims with 
collateral, preserving seniority over other claims, relying on the absolute priority rule,
12 
renegotiating bond terms, or restructuring the issuer. However, these measures have 
limitations. The bankruptcy laws define the procedures for forcing the bankrupt issuer to 
repay its obligations and the limits of the investor’s legal ability to force the repayment. 
However, the procedures and limits may become blurred in a complex default and 
restructuring situation and may also be subject to court judgments. As such, these measures 
are likely to be too costly for individual investors to take. Meanwhile, the trustee may have to 
represent hundreds or thousands of bond investors under the trust indenture, whose interests 
or goals are diversified (diffuse ownership problem). In such circumstances, the trustee can 
hardly be flexible in renegotiating bond terms or restructuring the issuer when a default 
occurs, which prevents the trustee and the defaulted issuer from promptly reaching an 
agreeable solution for the default (holdout problem).
13  
                                                 
12 In principle, bankruptcy laws require senior creditors to be fully paid before junior creditors and stockholders 
may receive any payment in the event of liquidation. However, a court judgment may deviate from this rule 
when the court finds increasing the defaulted issuer’s value or continuing the issuer’s operations (deviations or 
violations of absolute priority) beneficial to creditors. The application of the rule varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and from case to case. 
13 For example of the trustee’s inflexibility, see section 316(a) of the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 
  12Table   3.1: Issuing Expenses of Public Issue of Corporate Bonds 
Recipient  Typical expense items 
Regulator or 
government 
Stamp duty, issue license fee (may take form of prospectus reviewing fee, 
securities registration fee, and so on) 
Stock exchange  Listing fee 
Intermediaries Underwriting,  management, and placement fees (“gross spread”), trustee fee, 
payment agent fee, listing agent fee, intermediaries’ out-of-pocket expenses  
Professionals  Legal fee, accountant’s fee, rating fee 
Miscellaneous  Prospectus printing expenses, road show expenses, staffing costs 
Source: Author.  
Note: The issuing expenses listed are accounting costs only; they do not include opportunity costs incurred during 
the issuing process. 
 
3.5  Issuing Costs 
Corporate bond issues incur issuing expenses in addition to coupon payments. The 
issuing expenses of publicly offered corporate bonds consist of accounting and opportunity 
costs. The accounting costs include taxes or fees payable to the regulator or the government, 
to the stock exchange, to intermediaries, and to professionals, as well as miscellaneous 
expenses (Table 3.1). The opportunity cost is potential gains that the issuer forgoes by 
choosing a public offering of bonds over a bank loan to finance an investment project. It 
emanates largely from the pre-launch period of a bond issue. 
The accounting costs of a public offering are rather fixed because of intermediaries’ 
costs of distribution. Most expense items are variable or semi-variable. For example, the 
gross spread—consisting of underwriting, management, and placement fees—accounts for 
the great majority of the issuing expenses and is normally charged as a percentage of the 
bond issue amount. The rate ranges roughly from one-eighth of 1 percent to a few percentage 
points of the issue amount. By contrast, some expenses, such as legal fees, tend to be 
inelastic to the issue amount. The gross spread is likely to have a larger effect on the 
economies of scale of issue size than will any explicitly invariable expenses. In a competitive 
market, the intermediaries charge the gross spread at a lower rate for a larger issue size.
14 
They are usually reluctant to underwrite, manage, or place a public offering of a small 
                                                 
14 Other factors, such as the issuer’s credit quality or bargaining power and the intermediary’s desire to 
penetrate into particular issuers, may lower the gross spread that the intermediary charges. 
  13Figure   3.3: Time Frame for Stand-Alone Public Offering in Emerging Markets 
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amount, or they increase the fee rate for an issue of a small amount—probably because the 
cost of mobilizing a retail sales force or a large distribution network is inflexible.
15  
The most critical cost element in a stand-alone public offering could be 
uncontrollable opportunity costs in complying with disclosure requirements. The prospectus 
review process (turnaround time) is uncertain and tends to be unpredictably prolonged and 
costly (Figure 3.3). For an emerging market issue, the pre-launch period may take several 
months or even more. Furthermore, the issuer cannot really control the length of the pre-
launch period. The regulator often encourages the issuer to consult or coordinate with the 
regulator before the issuer officially submits the offering prospectus for review and approval. 
The issuer also prefers this route to avoid being embarrassed by the regulator’s possible 
disapproval of the prospectus. Where a regulation obliges the regulator to finish reviewing 
the prospectus in a predetermined period, the regulator may not officially accept the 
prospectus for review until it is fully satisfied with the contents of the prospectus. Pre-
offering marketing activity, including book building, is not allowed before the prospectus is 
approved. Consequently, the consultation period tends to be unpredictably protracted, and the 
issuer incurs an opportunity cost. 
                                                 
15 Some prior studies argue that the fixed costs of public offerings are larger than those of private placements 
(Blackwell and Kidwell 1988; Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam 1999; Smith 1986; Yaman 2005).  
  14The opportunity cost of disclosure compliance is a function of the expected rate of 
return of an investment project. The total cost of bond issuance Ft and the opportunity cost of 
bond issuance relative to bank borrowing fo can be denoted as follows: 
 F t = (at + D E(Ri)) (Tpr +Tpo) + avD + af  
 f o = D E(Ri) (Tpr +Tpo – Tb), 
where  
Ft is the total cost of a stand-alone public offer, fo is the opportunity cost of a stand-
alone public offer, at is the accounting cost per time unit of a stand-alone public offer 
variable with the length of the pre-launch period, D is the amount of the debt to be 
issued through a stand-alone public offer, E(Ri) is the expected rate of return on the 
project in which the issuer will invest the debt proceeds, Tpr is the length of the pre-
launch period, Tpo is the length of the post-launch period, Tb is the length of the bank 
loan processing period, av is the accounting cost of a stand-alone public offer variable 
with the amount of the debt to be issued, and af is the fixed accounting costs of a 
stand-alone public offer. 
The borrower (issuer) would likely choose to take a bank loan instead of issuing 
bonds when the issuance cost exceeds the benefit of the bond issue over the bank loan.
16,17 
The bond issuance cost model above implies some of the borrower’s behavior. First, a better 
prospect for the project would discourage the borrower from a bond issue (the higher the 
expected rate of return is, the larger the opportunity cost will be).
18,19 Second, the uncertainty 
of the ultimate opportunity cost may turn the borrower toward a bank loan, whose cost is 
relatively certain. The borrower has little control over the length of the pre- and post-launch 
                                                 
16 The benefit of the bond issue over the bank loan consists mainly of the positive present value of differences in 
coupon and interest payments, net of miscellaneous expenses such as paying agents’ fees and listing fees that 
accrue after the closing of the bond issue. 
17 Some statutes may restrict bond issuance. Company laws in some countries provide for the approval of bond 
issuance at the general shareholders’ meeting (instead of the approval by the board of directors only), set 
eligibility rules for bond issuance, and place limits on outstanding bonds, while such restrictions do not apply to 
bank loans.  
18 The preference of growing companies for private placements over public offerings may also be explained by 
contracting costs caused by moral hazards (Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam 1999). 
19 The expected rate of return should be higher than the all-in cost of a bond issue. The all-in cost is the coupon 
rate plus the amortized accounting costs of a bond issue, including a primary issue discount or premium. 
  15periods.
20,21 The pre-launch period may become infinite or extremely long, should the 
borrower miss a market window for the planned bond issue. Third, the borrower’s choice 
between a bond issue and a bank loan could be highly sensitive to the length of the pre- and 
post-launch periods. The expected rate of return could be several times as large as the 
funding spread between a bond issue and a bank loan.
22  
A protracted reviewing period could also reflect high contracting costs of issuers in 
emerging economies. The market regulator primarily represents the public, demanding 
extensive disclosures from the issuer. Contracting costs to the issuer are likely to be lower 
with non-retail investors than with the public, especially in the case of emerging economies, 
because of the closed ownership structure and weak corporate governance environment 
prevailing in emerging economies. The difference in contracting costs between institutional 
investors and the public could be so large that the issuer may be discouraged from 
considering a public offering.  
3.6  Primary Market Efficiency 
Primary market efficiency would increase a supply of corporate bond issues more 
than secondary market liquidity would. Primary market efficiency refers to the ability of the 
issuer and intermediaries to offer securities expediently to investors to capture a market 
window. As has been discussed earlier, the intrinsic characteristics of corporate bonds 
generally limit the room for secondary liquidity enhancement. Instead, government bonds 
and money market instruments play a role as liquidity assets in investment management. 
Infrequent issuers would have difficulty translating secondary market liquidity, if any, into a 
lower coupon rate in the primary market. Only a small number of large, high-quality, and 
                                                 
20 The bank loan processing period (Tb) is usually much shorter than the total bond issuance period (Tpr + Tpo) 
because the borrower normally has taken some bank loans by the time the borrower contemplates bond issuance 
and because banks are already familiar with the borrower’s operations and financial conditions. 
21 The issuer may consider bridge financing a project with a bank loan to reduce opportunity costs before 
refinancing the project with a public offering of bonds. In such a case, however, the issuer has to have 
substantial bargaining power with the bank to terminate the loan at its discretion. Bridge financing in the money 
market might be an alternative. However, the capital market that has a liquid money market open to non-bank 
issuers is likely to have a broad choice of offering methods already in place. In addition, the issuer with access 
to the money market is likely to be listed on a stock exchange and well experienced in bond issuance. 
22 The spread, if any, will be the main benefit of the bond issue in addition to a fixed interest cost, low 
refinancing risk, and financing source diversification. 
  16regular issuers can turn secondary market liquidity into a lower coupon rate. Thus, the degree 
of primary market efficiency significantly affects economies of corporate bond finance.  
4.  Regulatory Focus on Non-retail Investors 
The regulator can differentiate the degree of investor protection by type of investors. 
The expeditiousness of offering procedures saves issuing expenses and opportunity costs and 
reduces risk. However, the issuance process period is often too long because the regulatory 
focus of corporate bond issuance has been placed on protection of the public. In reality, non-
retail investors, especially institutional investors, are the core investor base for corporate 
bonds. Conventional regulation for corporate bond issuance may have been disconnecting 
corporate bond issuers and investors in emerging economies.  
4.1  Expeditious Procedures 
The expeditiousness of offering procedures is a matter not only of expenses and 
opportunity costs but also of risk management. The immediacy of transactions has become 
increasingly important even to issuers in emerging markets to limit market risk. Most 
emerging economies have been integrated into the volatile global economy. Yet issuers in 
most emerging markets do not have means to hedge against market risk for seven to eight 
months or more. Even if they had it, it would be too expensive. 
A typical stand-alone public offering of corporate bonds in an emerging market takes 
a few months or sometimes more than a year.
23 FOA (2005) reports that the issuance process 
takes 13 to 14 months in China. A survey of 28 countries done for this paper shows that the 
time for a stand-alone public offering ranges from 8 to 51 weeks (Box 4.1). By comparison, 
in the Eurobond market, a public offering for a new or infrequent issuer takes two months 
(eight weeks) (Table 4.1) and a few days or hours for a frequent issuer (Table 4.2). The 
reduction of the approval process from between 9 and 12 months to no more than 15 days 
seems to have contributed to the recent emergence of the Malaysian corporate bond market 
(BIS 2007). 
 
                                                 
23 This period is calculated from the time the issuer resolves the issuance of bonds until the closure of the 
issuance.  
  17 
 
Box   4.1: Survey on Duration of Corporate Bond Issuance Processes 
A survey was conducted on the duration of corporate bond issuance processes in emerging 
markets by e-mailing a response format to 70 regulators and approximately 30 intermediaries in emerging 
markets from October 2007 to March 2008. The regulators and intermediaries were asked the number of 
weeks that corporate issuers realistically take for each of the following: bond issuance authorization by the 
issuer, documentation, prospectus review by the regulator, offering, and closing of stand-alone public 
offerings (see Figure 3.3) in their markets. 
Useful responses were collected from the regulators and intermediaries of the following countries: 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. The responses are not 
necessarily consistent, and they are small in number. Therefore, the results are not suitable for a rigorous 
analysis. Nonetheless, they provide a general view of the duration of the corporate bond issuance 
processes (see Figure 4.1).  














































































Avg.=23 weeks  
Avg.=19 weeks  
Avg.=15 weeks  
Avg.=14 weeks  







Note: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, LAC = Latin 
America and the Caribbean, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, SA = South Asia, 
and EAP = East Asia and Pacific Region; R = regulator and I = intermediary. Some 
responses did not provide the number of weeks for bond issuance authorization by the 
issuer, offering, or closing; in such cases, the author assigned one week to each of the 
processes. 
 
  18Table   4.1: Bond Issuance Process in the Eurobond Market for New or Infrequent Issuers 
Date Event  Responsibility 
X − 47 days  Mandate awarded  Issuer 
X − 46 days  Document request list sent to issuer   Lead manager and 
lawyers 
X − 43 days  Information received replying to the list  Issuer 
X − 40 days  All regulatory approvals and all relevant authorizations applied 
for (in the issuer’s home country), if required 
Issuer 
X − 39 days  First draft of offering circular distributed to issuer and to lead 
manager for comment 
Lead manager and 
lawyers 
X − 36 days  Initial comments on offering circular received from issuer and 
lead manager 
Issuer 
X − 33/34 
days 
Due diligence/verification meetings  Issuer and lead 
manager 
X − 31 days  Revised draft of offering circular distributed to all parties, 
including LuSE 
Lead manager and 
lawyers 
X − 17 days  Preliminary comments received from LuSE and further 
comments received from all parties 
Listing agent, lead 
manager, and lawyers 
X − 15 days  Revised draft of offering circular circulated; subscription 
agreement and other documents distributed for review 
Lead manager and 
lawyers 
X − 8 days  Further comments received from LuSE  Listing agent, lead 
manager, and lawyers 
X − 6 days  Further draft of offering circular circulated for final comments  Lead manager and 
lawyers 
X − 4 days  All regulatory approvals and authorizations to be in place; final 
comments received from LuSE; draft subscription agreement 
and other documents approved by all parties; final draft of 
offering circular distributed for signoff 
Issuer 
X   Launch; commencement of road shows (could start earlier); any 
preliminary offering circular to be printed and distributed; 
documents distributed to managers for review 
Listing agent and lead 
manager 
X + 3 days  LuSE to sign off; bringdown due diligence call; pricing and 
allocation 
Lead manager, issuer, 
and lawyers 
X + 4 days  Signing of subscription agreement and other documents; printing 
of final offering circular 
Issuer, lead manager, 
and lawyers 
X + 9 days  Closing of the issue; listing to take place  Issuer, lead manager, 
and lawyers 
Source: Author and his interviews with Euro market parishioners. 
Note: X = launch date; LuSE = Luxembourg Stock Exchange (for example). 
 
Aligning disclosure requirements with an actual investor profile by choosing the 
optimal offering method would shorten the issuance process substantially. Complying with 
disclosure requirements is most responsible for the long and uncertain issuance process 
period of corporate bonds (Figure 3.3). An issuance process period consists of the pre-launch 
period and the post-launch period. The former is mainly for producing disclosure documents 
and clearing them from the regulator, while the latter is for placing the securities offered. In 
an emerging market issue, the pre-launch period may take several months, whereas the 
placement period may take one to four weeks.  
  19Table   4.2: Bond Issuance Process in the Eurobond Market for Frequent Issuers: Book-Building Method 
Date Action  Communication 
medium 
X − 1 or 2 days  Lead manager requests syndicate members to conduct 
premarketing and may transmit to them a premarketing 
sheet with relevant public information. 
Telephone and fax  
X  Based on premarketing feedback, lead manager launches 
the transaction. 
Telephone 
X  Lead manager instructs syndicate members to log onto 
the Web site (in case an e-book-building system is used). 
Telephone 
X  Lead manager transmits syndicate members the official 
price-talk sheet via e-mail or Bloomberg message. The 
syndicate members submit to lead manager their orders 







Lead manager accepts protection requests. A preliminary 
prospectus is issued to syndicate members. 
Telephone and fax  
X + 2 or 3 days  Lead manager prices the issue.    
Same day as pricing  Lead manager transmits pricing to syndicate members 
and confirms their acceptance of pricing. 
E-mail, Bloomberg, 
or Web site 
Within 1 day after 
pricing 
Lead manager transmits final allotment notice.  E-mail, Bloomberg, 
or Web site 
As soon as possible 
after pricing 
(Final securities registration statement supplement is 
filed, if registration is required.) 
 
Before closing  Final prospectus supplement is issued, and its receipt is 
acknowledged by the exchange. 
E-mail, Bloomberg, 
or Web site 
Before subscription  Other issue materials are distributed by hand or by fax.   
X + 5 days  Subscription   
X +7 or more days  Closing   
Source: Author and his interviews with Euro market practitioners. 
Notes: a. Captive or open e-bookbuilding system. ‘Bookrunner’ intranet screen of IPMA is an open system 
 
4.2  Regulatory Focus 
The regulatory focus of corporate bond issuance has been placed on the protection of 
the public in many emerging markets. This regulatory stance assumes that each issue of 
corporate bonds may attract many financially unsophisticated or uninformed retail investors. 
Thus, the regulation of corporate bond issuance ensures the protection of the public through a 
regulator-approved prospectus describing the issuer and the offered bond. The regulator 
attempts to ensure that the disclosure in the prospectus is comprehensive, accurate, 
understandable, and timely.
24 As a result, the issuer has to spend many months satisfying the 
regulator about these aspects before the regulator signs off on the prospectus.  
                                                 
24 Some trade-off occurs among the four factors—comprehensiveness, accuracy, understandability, and 
timeliness—of disclosure. For example, if the issuer and the regulator try to make sure that a disclosure is 
comprehensive and accurate, the disclosure document may become less easy to understand or less timely to use 
  20In advanced markets, however, the majority of corporate bonds are normally placed 
with institutional investors because of the intrinsic characteristics of corporate bonds. 
Occasionally, affluent investors may also participate in the primary distribution of corporate 
bonds. Few retail investors subscribe to primary issues of corporate bonds or buy them in the 
secondary market. Therefore, the corporate issuer usually prefers targeting its bonds to non-
retail investors, unless the retail market offers exceptional opportunities that cannot be 
ignored. Many bond issues can avoid involving retail investors. 
Advanced markets have developed offering methods for securities that make such 
offerings expeditious and cost-effective to non-retail investors. These methods are traditional 
private placements, institutional offerings, and shelf registration. Different disclosure 
standards apply to different kinds of investors and different circumstances depending on 
target investors’ financial sophistication and resourcefulness as well as on the availability of 
periodic disclosure. Regulators impose less or no disclosure on securities offerings targeted 
to financially sophisticated and resourceful investors. Credible issuers whose information is 
reliably available from periodic reporting may be required to provide only minimal offering 
disclosure at a takedown. 
So far, corporate bonds in emerging markets do not appear to differ from those in 
advanced markets in their intrinsic characteristics. Moreover, bank deposits dominate private 
savings, and non-bank intermediaries in most emerging markets do not have the resources to 
maintain the extensive retail distribution network that exists in advanced markets. In such an 
environment, helping the issuer target its bond issues to non-retail investors is one of the first 
strategic choices to catalyze corporate bond market development. Nonetheless, many 
emerging markets do not have the regulatory framework for corporate bond issuance that 
may economically best suit the targeted investor base. The absence or insufficiency of the 
regulatory framework may also be attributable to the underdevelopment of institutional 
investors in emerging economies.  
                                                                                                                                                       
for making an investment decision. This trade-off is a basis for adjusting disclosure requirements to target 
investors’ characteristics.  
  214.3  Differentiated Protection 
The indiscriminate approach represented by a public offer filing in emerging 
economies may be responsible for disconnecting corporate bond issuers and investors. The 
disclosure requirements and procedures for corporate bond issuance in emerging markets are 
largely designed to protect the least sophisticated and least resourceful group of investors. 
Compliance with these procedures is unnecessarily expensive in cost and time to issuers, 
given that the most likely investors in corporate bonds are financially sophisticated and 
resourceful institutions. In the initial state of corporate bond market development, a 
regulatory mismatch occurs between the issuer and the investor. 
The regulator can differentiate the degree of investor protection by the type of 
investors. U.K. law is explicit in this respect. In considering what degree of protection may 
be appropriate, the regulator is required to take into account the differing degrees of 
experience and expertise that different investors may have.
25 Those investors who usually do 
not have full protection under securities laws are affluent or financially sophisticated. They 
normally include institutions such as banks, brokers, dealers, pension funds, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds, as well as natural persons who have a high net worth or a large 
annual income.
26 They may also include insiders, such as directors and executive officers of 
the issuer.
27  
Differentiated protection would help prevent dual regulatory costs to protect end 
investors. The government regulates and supervises most institutional investors to protect 
their beneficiaries, or end investors.
28 The government should ensure that each regulated 
institutional investor is staffed with competent managers and professionals and that their 
financial dealings are prudent. Meanwhile, the government also regulates and supervises the 
securities market to protect the public, for example, by making sure that the issuer’s 
                                                 
25 See section 5(2)(b) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
26 In the U.S. market, they include “any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net 
worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under management” is defined as an 
accredited investor (section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act of 1933; section 230.501(a) of the Code of Federal 
Regulations; section 77b(a)(15) of the United States Code). Under the Prospectus Directive of the European 
Union, they are defined as qualified investors (article 2(1)(e)). 
27 See section 230.501(a)(4) of U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 
28 Such beneficiaries are contributors of pension funds, policyholders of insurance companies, unit-holders of 
mutual funds, and so on. 
  22  23
disclosure is comprehensive, accurate, understandable, and timely and that the intermediary’s 
conduct is fair. If regulated institutional investors are compelled to invest in publicly offered 
securities, the public pays regulatory costs for the protection of its interests twice. 
Occasionally, such double regulation and supervision may be desirable or unavoidable; 
however, a policy effort can minimize it in the public interest. Keeping a regulator 
accountable distinctly for its own regulatory objective would be preferable. 
5.  Economical Offering Methods 
Adopting offering methods better suited to non-retail investors will likely make bond 
issuance an economical financing option for corporate issuers in emerging economies. The 
corporate bond market is likely to serve non-retail investors well in three ways: traditional 
private placements, institutional offerings, and shelf registration facilitated by integrated 
disclosure (Table 5.1). Traditional private placements are normally suitable for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) or unlisted closed companies, such as family-owned companies. 
These companies dominate many emerging markets and need debt capital for growth because 
external equity capital is expensive to their controlling shareholders. Even large and 
established companies occasionally issue bonds privately to meet the needs of particular 
institutional investors. Institutional offerings could conveniently meet the debt-financing 
need of well-established but unlisted companies and foreign governments and companies. 
Public offerings facilitated by integrated disclosure, such as shelf registration in the U.S. 
market and three-part disclosure in the Euro market, are generally suitable for seasoned, large, 
and frequent issuers. Table   5.1: Comparison of Offering Methods for Corporate Bonds 
Private placements  Public offerings 
Characteristics  Traditional private placements  Institutional offerings  Shelf registration  Stand-alone public offerings 
Suitable issuers  Any issuers, but notably SMEs 
and unlisted closed companies 
such as family-owned companies 
Well-established but unlisted 
companies, as well as foreign 
governments and companies that 
publish periodic reports; some 
unlisted state-owned enterprises 
(with no exempt security status); 
some listed but infrequent issuers
Seasoned, large, listed, and 
frequent issuers (such as, utility 
companies, financial institutions, 
and foreign governments) 
Well-established, listed, and 
infrequent issuers, including 
foreign governments and 
companies 
Investors (offerees)  Institutional investors and 
affluent investors  
 
Mutual funds may invest in 
private placements if their 
investment policies permit. 
Qualified investors (such as 
specified types of institutional 
investors) 
 
Some institutional investors are 
not permitted to invest in unlisted 
securities. 
Mostly institutional investors, but 
occasionally retail investors 
Mostly institutional investors, but 
occasionally retail investors 
Investor protection   Usually none  Usually none  High  High 
Disclosure and 
documentation 
Voluntary and discretionary 
through an offering circular 
(information memorandum) but 
satisfactory to investors 
Semiformal through a 
standardized offering circular 
(information memorandum), 
close to a public offer prospectus 
Formal and full at registration 
(for example, once every 2 years), 
and integrated disclosure 
(incorporation by reference) for 
individual issues 
Formal and full 
Issuance process time Short  Very short  Very short for individual issues  Long 
Regulatory review 
and approval 
Not required  Not required  Required once a registration 
period (for example, every 2 
years), but not for each issue 
Required 
Trading  Highly restricted and may be 
locked up for some years 
Tradable among qualified 
investors, some liquidity 
Freely tradable, more liquidity 
than institutional offerings 
Freely tradable but mostly 
inactive 
Confidentiality High  Very  low  None  None 
Covenants  Tight  Loose or none  Loose or none  Loose or none 
Credit rating  Generally not required  Not required but preferable  Generally required  Generally required 
Listing  Not allowed  Generally not required
a  Generally required  Generally required 
Investment yield  Generally high  Generally low but may be higher 
than public offerings 
Generally low  Generally low 
Total issuing costs 
(including 
opportunity costs) 
Low  Low  Low for frequent and large-size 
issuers 
High 
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Private placements  Public offerings 
Characteristics  Traditional private placements  Institutional offerings  Shelf registration  Stand-alone public offerings 
and market risk 
Issue size  Small to medium (although in an 
advanced market, private 
placements of a large size are not 
uncommon) 
Medium to large  Large (a large size is desirable for 
economies of scale) 
Large (a large size is desirable for 
economies of scale) 
Structure  Flexible or tailored to the issuer’s 
or investors’ specific needs 
Standardized, but could vary for 
individual issues (for example, 
medium-term notes) 





Highly possible and flexible  Inflexible and difficult  Inflexible and difficult  Inflexible and difficult 
Preconditions in the 
market structure 
    A well-organized report filing 
system at the regulator and an 
adequate and credible market 




Note: a. May be listed on an “exchange-regulated market”, but not on a regulated exchange.  5.1  Traditional Private Placements 
Traditional private placements refer to offerings of securities that are made to no 
more than a certain number of investors and that are exempt from the requirements of 
securities registration or prospectus filing. This definition is narrower than what is commonly 
known as private placement. Traditional private placements do not include small issue 
offerings that are exempt from securities registration or prospectus offerings because of the 
small issue amounts. They do not include institutional offerings either.
29 Private placements 
may be broadly defined as offerings of securities that are not made to the public, including 
institutional offerings and other types of offerings. They are subject to restrictions imposed 
on the issuer and the investor to qualify for the exemption. 
Market intermediaries may place traditional private placements on an agency basis
30 
or may underwrite them. A syndicate, even if formed, is not large. Financial institutions, such 
as insurance companies, investing in a traditional private placement may be allowed to act as 
an intermediary for the rest of the issue. Intermediation may involve coordinating bilateral 
negotiation between the issuer and prospective investors on the terms and conditions of the 
issue, including covenants. 
5.1.1  Salient features of traditional private placements 
Issuers often find traditional private placements advantageous because of their low 
issuance costs, speed, confidentiality, and re-negotiability (Figure 1.1 and Table 5.1). At the 
same time, traditional private placements allow the investor to demand that the issuer 
discloses information as needed and accept covenants negotiated for each financing situation 
and to monitor the issuer’s performance closely. Traditional private placements also allow 
the investor to renegotiate the terms of bonds flexibly, should the issuer either become more 
creditworthy or technically default. These features culminate in lower issuing costs to certain 
issuers, such as SMEs or unlisted closed companies such as family-owned companies.  
 
                                                 
29 Carey and others (1993) and Prowse (1997) distinguish traditional private placements from Rule 144A issues, 
which are institutional offerings in the U.S. market. 
30 Intermediaries acting on an agency basis are called placement agents or arrangers. 
  26Confidentiality and tailored disclosure alleviate the problem of information 
asymmetry between the issuer and the investor. In traditional private placements, the issuer 
would be willing to disclose more information to its targeted or committed investor than to 
the public in public offerings. The investor can conduct direct and close due diligence instead 
of relying totally on the intermediary for due diligence, as in a public offering, thereby 
reducing the information asymmetry problem (Emerick and White 1992; Krishnaswami, 
Spindt, and Subramaniam 1999). Thus, the investor can more accurately assess the value of a 
traditional private placement than a public offering.  
The investor’s monitoring of the issuer’s performance, together with the discipline 
that custom-made covenants impose on the issuer, would reduce the issuer’s agency costs
31 
(Berlin and Mester 1992; Blackwell and Kidwell 1988; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam 1999; Kwan and Carleton 1995, 2004; Malitz 
1994; Smith and Warner 1979; Yaman 2005). Traditional private placements are more 
effective in controlling the conflicts between the bondholder and the stockholder than public 
offerings are. Consequently, the investor could accept a lower yield on the issuer’s privately 
placed debt than on a public offering.
32  
Traditional private placements may lower direct issuing costs by reducing the 
information asymmetry and agency costs, thereby saving issuance expenses. The reduction of 
the information asymmetry and agency costs will likely lower the yield to maturity of debt 
issues. The exemption from filing a prospectus with the regulator will save the issuer direct 
costs, such as fees payable to the regulator, printing expenses, underwriting and placement 
fees, and listing fees (Blackwell and Kidwell 1988; Carey and others 1993; Krishnaswami, 
Spindt, and Subramaniam 1999).  
In addition, the renegotiability of bond terms can be valuable to the issuer as well as 
to the investor (Beneish and Press 1993; Carey and others 1993; Chen and Wei 1993; 
Emerick and White 1992; Kwan and Carleton 1995, 2004; Malitz 1994; Smith 1993). A 
renegotiation event may occur in two situations: (a) with its improved creditworthiness, the 
                                                 
31 Such costs include those related to risk shifting, underinvestment, and cash flow problems. 
32 The owner, manager, or controlling shareholders of the issuer may see this reduction of agency costs as the 
cost of monitoring external capital to the extent that they lose the ability to extract private benefits from the 
issuer.  
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(b) the issuer wants to survive an unexpected but manageable adverse situation, such as a 
technical default. In an adverse situation, the issuer may attempt to hold on by implementing 
a new business strategy. In either situation, the investors—who are small in number, well 
informed, and sophisticated—will likely be capable of assessing the viability of the issuer 
under the new conditions. They will likely consider accepting the renegotiated terms of the 
bond if they find more value in the renegotiated terms than in the existing terms (for example, 
the immediately liquidated value of the issuer, or smaller distress costs). 
5.1.2  Relevance to emerging economies 
Traditional private placements can play a significant role in emerging economies. 
Issuers characterized by information asymmetry and agency problems are dominant in many 
emerging economies. Such issuers include SMEs, family-owned companies, or small free-
float companies. In addition, the business environment prevailing in emerging economies 
tends to amplify information asymmetry and agency problems. Legal, regulatory, corporate 
governance and accounting frameworks are often weak in emerging economies.  
In family-owned or small free-float companies, the owner or the controlling 
shareholder tends to be reluctant to disclose inside information to the public. Under an 
incomplete system of legal protection, the owner or the controlling shareholder may be 
selective in sharing inside information with the public for competitive reasons or for his or 
her private benefit. Family-owned or small free-float companies are likely to overlap SMEs. 
An expeditious issuing process of traditional private placements, compared with the 
public offering process, may be of great value to issuers in many emerging markets. The 
review process of a public offering prospectus tends to be prolonged and uncertain in many 
emerging markets, thus causing the issuer a great opportunity loss. Besides reviewing a 
prospectus, the regulator also scrutinizes the offering on its merits if the regulatory system is 
merit based. If the regulator is constrained in resources, experience, or capacity, approving a 
prospectus may take a few to several months or more. The regulation may set a reasonable 
period in which the regulator should approve or disapprove the prospectus, but the issuer and 
the intermediary often complain that the regulator does not formally accept the application 
for prospectus approval until it understands the contents of the prospectus. Pre-offering 
  28marketing activity, including book building, is not allowed before prospectus approval. 
Traditional private placements would eliminate or alleviate such opportunity loss. 
The market of traditional private placements can serve as a testing ground for 
products new to an emerging market. Many debt products have yet to be introduced into 
emerging markets. The regulator may not be sure how to regulate a new product to protect 
the public in the local context. Hence, the existing rules and regulations may not be adequate 
for the new product. Traditional private placements would familiarize the local market with 
the new product. Without exposing the public to risks prematurely, traditional private 
placements would also allow the regulator to learn how the local legal and economic 
framework may or may not work for the product. Some structured products such as asset-
backed securities may be too complex for the public by nature. Traditional private 
placements could be a cost-effective way for sophisticated market participants to benefit 
from such complex products. 
Traditional private placements can allow debt products to meet the issuer’s needs 
flexibly in the absence or dearth of cash management and hedging instruments in emerging 
markets. They can accommodate nonstandard features of bond cash flows such as delayed 
takedowns and early and partial repayments. Publicly offered debt issues are increasingly 
structured to have a “bullet” repayment
33 to appeal to the broadest possible universe of the 
public. As a result, the issuer of a publicly offered debt has to manage unmatched cash flows 
and may desire to hedge its market risks. Instead, the issuer in an emerging market, who does 
not have access to effective cash management and hedging instruments, may choose 
traditional private placements to avoid the need for sophisticated cash management or a 
hedging operation.  
Traditional private placements help circumvent the underdeveloped retail distribution 
network in many emerging markets. A retail network entails large fixed costs. Commercial 
banks are likely to be the only financial institutions that can afford to have an extensive retail 
network in most emerging economies. Nonetheless, banks in emerging economies usually do 
not have incentive to distribute financial products that may compete with bank deposits. 
                                                 
33 The whole principal of an issue is repaid in a single repayment at maturity. 
  29Therefore, traditional private placements are a practical way for the issuer in an emerging 
economy to access investors directly. 
Traditional private placements appear amenable to Islamic requirements for debt. 
Most Islamic countries are emerging economies. Many of their prospective issuers in the 
private sector have the profile of traditional private placement issuers. Their markets are also 
in short supply of long-term investment products that are compatible with Islamic 
requirements (Shari’ah). Islamic requirements—such as having a non-interest-bearing nature, 
being asset linked, requiring collateralization and risk-profit participation, and imposing 
certain restrictions on trading financial claims (that is, trading of pure debt only at par)—can 
curb the tradability of Islamic products. Takaful insurance companies and Islamic mutual 
funds would benefit from an increased availability of Islamic medium- and long-term debt 
products through traditional private placements.  
Experience in traditional private placement may help prepare the issuer for the 
institutional offering market—and later for the public offering market. The traditional private 
placement market is open ended for the issuer. It could be a springboard for more extensively 
marketed or larger issues of the issuer’s bonds. The issuer will preliminarily learn about the 
disclosure and issuance process at a much lower cost through a traditional private placement 
than with a stand-alone public offering. Concurrently, key investors and intermediaries will 
come to know more about the issuer. The issuer will be able to upgrade its disclosure 
documentation and sophisticate its cash management or financial planning through a gradual 
process from traditional private placements to public offerings.  
5.1.3  Regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework for traditional private placements needs to satisfy three key 
elements: exemption, clarity, and protection. The regulation needs to exempt the issuer and 
the intermediary from prospectus filing requirements, set clear conditions for the exemption, 
and still protect the public.  
The exemption from prospectus filing requirements (safe harbor) is aimed at 
minimizing or eliminating the issuer’s or the intermediary’s liability under the public offering 
provisions of the securities legislation. Neither the issuer nor the intermediary of a traditional 
private placement is required to file a prospectus or other information documents with the 
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issuer and the intermediary will not be held liable for noncompliance with disclosure 
requirements for a public offering; however, they should remain liable for fraud, including 
material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the private placement. They may 
be exempted from some other procedural requirements under the securities legislation. As a 
result, the information on a private placement that the issuer and the intermediary provide to 
the investor can be less than or different from that in a regulator-approved prospectus. 
The clarity of the rules for the exemption underpins the economy of traditional 
private placements. Many emerging markets have some rules for traditional private 
placements in place, but their rules are often not clear enough. In such a case, the issuer or 
the intermediary is compelled to “consult” or “informally clear” with the regulator, which 
defeats the primary purpose of traditional private placements. A set of clear rules, when 
consistently applied, enhances the predictability of law. Ideally, the rules need to be so clear 
that the issuer and the intermediary, by acting on the rules, may comfortably place bonds 
without prior clearance from the regulator. In advanced markets, the issuer and the 
intermediary rely on a legal opinion by their legal counsel. Otherwise, ambiguous or 
insufficient rules—or their inconsistent application—would likely make the legality of a 
traditional private placement uncertain, thus increasing the cost of the placement.  
In traditional private placements, the regulator protects the public in a different 
manner from that used in public offerings. An objective of securities regulation is to protect 
financially unsophisticated and resource-constrained investors both in public offerings and in 
private placements. The regulator’s primary role in a public offering is to ensure that the 
disclosure is accurate, comprehensive, timely, and understandable. In a private placement, 
the regulatory goal is that no privately placed securities should leak out to unqualified 
investors or to more than a lawful number of investors (leakage).  
The traditional private placement rules generally qualify investors, on the basis of 
their type or number, and restrict general solicitation (placement restrictions). Such investor 
qualifications typically include the following: 
•  Institutional investors, including banks, cooperatives, securities firms, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds 
  31•  Corporations with assets of at least a specified amount  
•  Affluent individuals with assets or income of at least specified amounts  
•  Nonresident or foreign investors
34 
The restriction on general solicitation is concerned with the potential that non-qualified 
investors may be approached in soliciting orders for offered securities. It prohibits the issuer 
or the intermediary from contacting non-qualified investors or from marketing securities in a 
way that exposes non-qualified investors to information on the securities. An information 
document may be circulated only to qualified investors. Advertisements or indiscreet 
communications are normally not allowed.
35  
A number of investors ranging roughly from 35 to 100 is generally a factor in 
qualifying an issue for the exemption. However, the way the number is counted varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The number is usually counted in a certain period of time to 
prevent the exemption rule from being abused. Table 5.2 shows some country examples of 
the number of investors qualifying for the exemption. The issuer is usually required to ensure 
that the investor is a qualified investor for private placements and purchases privately issued 
securities for investment but not for distribution. The issuer is also required to make sure that 
the investor fully understands the merits and risks of the securities and the restrictions 
attached to them. Although exempted from the disclosure requirements of a public offering, 
the issuer is usually required to disseminate sufficient, current public information concerning 
the issuer and the securities. The issuer typically produces an information document about 
the issue, commonly known as a private placement memorandum, information memorandum, 
or offering circular, which may be circulated without general solicitation.  
The resale of privately placed bonds is normally restricted (resale restrictions). The 
investor is not allowed to resell the securities for a certain period (the holding period)—for 
example, one or two years
36—unless the investor’s circumstances have unexpectedly 
                                                 
34 Nonresident and foreign investors may be viewed simply as those outside a country’s jurisdiction rather than 
as being qualified for private placements. 
35 Posting information about the securities on a Web site without password protection is likely to be construed 
as advertising. 
36 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission shortened the holding period from two years to one year in 
1997 and to six months in February 2008 for restricted securities of issuers that are reporting companies. 
  32Table   5.2: The Number of Investors for a Traditional Private Placement 
Country Number  of  investors Remarks 
European Union  100 investors or less per EU 
member state 
Unlimited number of qualified 
investors 
Japan  49 investors or less  Unlimited number of qualified 
institutional investors 
United Kingdom  No more than 50 persons  Unlimited number of various 
qualified investors 
United States  35 nonaccredited investors or 
fewer 
Unlimited number of accredited 
investors 
Sources: Laws and regulations of the respective jurisdictions. 
 
changed. The subsequent investor also must be a qualified investor. When the issuer is 
required to ensure the resale restrictions as well as the placement restrictions, the issuer may 
require the investor to sign an investment letter.
37 Alternatively, the issuer may place a 
private placement legend
38 and elaborate the restrictions in an information document or a 
purchase agreement. A requirement to denominate a bond in a substantially large amount 
could be effective in restricting the placement and resale of privately placed bonds. These 
restrictive measures are aimed at preventing an issuer from disguising a de facto pub
offering as a private placement to evade discl
lic 
osure requirements. 
                                                
The issuer of a private placement may be required to report the transaction 
information of the issue to the regulator. Even ex post facto information would be useful for 
the authority in monitoring market activity and formulating and implementing better 
regulations. Low cost and greater confidentiality are two of many perceived advantages of 
private placements. The regulator should weigh actual reporting requirements against 
negative factors, such as increasing cost and decreasing confidentiality. 
 
37 An investment letter or letter of investment intent is intended to establish that the issuer complies with the 
qualifications for the exemption. In the U.S. market, the investment letter constitutes a basis for the seller’s 
reliance on the exemption from securities registration (Rule 502(d) of Regulation D). 
38 A private placement legend is an emphatically written statement in certificates of securities and other 
securities offering documents that sets forth the unregistered status of the securities offered and their transfer 
restrictions. A country’s securities law, its regulations, or rules may set the standard form of the legend. Placing 
a restrictive legend on a bond certificate is not effective when privately issued bonds are in book-entry form. In 
such a case, the issuer may be required to lodge a stop transfer order against the bonds with the transfer agent. 
  335.2  Institutional Offerings 
Institutional offerings
39 are private placements or other exempt sales to specified 
types of institutions and other investors (qualified investors) that are readily resalable 
between qualified investors (Figure 1.1 and Table 5.1). Rule 144A issues and the majority of 
Euro bond issues exemplify institutional offerings. The private placement status of such 
offerings exempts them from securities registration and prospectus filing. The issuer may be 
required to prepare brief offering documents,
40 but these documents are not required to 
comply with the country’s disclosure standards for public offerings. Nonetheless, unlike 
traditional private placements, they are readily resalable among qualified investors.  
Qualified investors
41 generally include banks, brokers, dealers, pension funds, 
insurance companies, and mutual funds. In addition, they may include some non-financial 
companies and natural persons who have a high net-worth or a large annual income, 
depending on jurisdictions. They do not include retail investors. A country’s securities 
regulations should clearly define qualified investors for institutional offering purposes. A 
clear-cut definition would be a first step toward preventing institutionally placed bonds from 
leaking to the retail market. 
Institutional offerings would likely appeal to well-established but unlisted or non-
investment-grade companies such as family-owned companies. The public market is closed 
or too costly for them. Some unlisted state-owned enterprises with no exempt security status 
and some listed but infrequent issuers may also find institutional offerings practical. 
Furthermore, listed companies may prefer them in a market that is not advanced enough to 
use shelf registration. 
The immediate resalability of institutional offerings, however, requires their issuers to 
disclose information just short of disclosure required in public offerings. Because their 
secondary buyer cannot afford individual due diligence, the investor prefers issues with well-
                                                 
39 Institutional offerings are also known as institutional offers, institutional placements, and wholesale offers or 
offerings. 
40 In the U.S. market, a Rule 144A issuer that does not file reports with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is required to provide a brief statement of the its business and its products and services, as well as 
its audited financial statements for the preceding two years (Rule 144A(d)(4)). 
41 Such investors are called qualified institutional buyers in the U.S. market (Rule 144A(a)) and qualified 
investors in the European markets (article 2(1)(e) of the Prospectus Directive 2003). 
  34documented disclosure. Credit ratings may be desirable. Indeed, the U.S. law eventually 
grants the 144A securities holder and purchaser the right to obtain reasonably current 
information from an issuer that does not file periodic reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).
42,43 The issuer of an institutional offering in the Euro market 
usually seeks to list bonds. Listing is meant to disseminate disclosure information 
periodically to facilitate secondary market trading in the over-the-counter market. The issuer 
normally lists bonds outside the European Union (EU) or on exchange-regulated markets to 
escape EU disclosure requirements.
44 Thus, institutional offerings facilitate low-cost and 
expeditious offerings with no regulatory review, along with immediate resalability.  
Foreign issuers also are likely to use an institutional offering facility. Foreign issuers 
operating under disclosure standards different from ones in the market often benefit from 
accommodative disclosure requirements.
45 They can save reconciliation costs of financial 
statements and opportunity costs. Accordingly, Rule 144A issues by non-SEC-reporting 
firms
46 conveniently accommodate international issuers. Institutional offerings accounted for 
nearly 100 percent of corporate bond issues in the Singaporean market (Box 5.1). An 
institutional offering framework, together with an institutional investor base, could help 
develop the corporate bond market in some developing countries aspiring to be an 
international or regional financial hub. 
                                                 
42 Rule 144A(d)(4). 
43 For example, issues by SEC-reporting firms accounted for 77 percent of 1,418 observed domestic Rule144A 
issues from 1997 to 1999 in the U.S. market (Livingston and Zhou 2002).  
44 Exchange-regulated markets in Europe are an alternative to the “regulated market” (regulated by the regulator 
of a member state) under the Prospectus Directive, allowing the issuers to avoid the need for a prospectus that is 
compliant with that directive. These exchange-regulated markets include the Alternative Securities Market of 
the Irish Stock Exchange, the Euro MTF Market of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, and the Professional 
Securities Market of the London Stock Exchange.  
45 The Prospectus Directive has an exemption from the requirement to use International Accounting Standards 
for non-equity securities with a denomination of at least €50,000 (wholesale debt). Under a nonpublic or limited 
offering exemption in conjunction with Rule 144A, non-U.S. issuers are permitted to access qualified 
institutional buyers in the U.S. Rule 144A market without having to comply with SEC accounting and related 
requirements. 
46 Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) and Livingston and Zhou (2002) discuss, among other things, the 
relationship between U.S. disclosure requirements and foreign and domestic Rule 144A issuers. 
  35Box   5.1: Corporate Bond Issues in Singapore 
Singapore’s corporate bond market consists of Singapore-dollar (S$) and non-Singapore-dollar 
segments in terms of currency. Although the former is growing modestly, the latter is larger and growing 
fast (Figure 5.1). Despite its short history, the Singapore corporate bond market is sophisticated. Both 
domestic and foreign issuers in the market routinely use medium-term note programs and special-purpose 
vehicle structures. Professionals in the market are abreast of new financial technologies and techniques. 
 
Nonpublic offerings are dominant in the market. Public offerings of Singapore-dollar corporate 
bonds accounted for 35 percent of the total corporate bond issuance in 1999, when the market saw policy-
induced public offerings by statutory boards. However, their share fell sharply to 1 percent in 2002. Public 
offerings of non-Singapore-dollar corporate bonds accounted for only 3 percent of the total corporate bond 
issuance in 1999, further declining to 0 percent in 2002 (Table 5.3). Although the same data for 2003 
onward is no longer available,
47 the dominance of nonpublic offerings is considered to have continued. 
Unlisted bonds accounted for 56 to 81 percent of issues of nongovernment debt securities in terms of issue 
amount from 2003 through the first quarter of 2007 (Table 5.4). 
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Table   5.3: Private Placements and Public Offerings of Corporate Bonds in Singapore (1999–2002) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 
Private placement  65%  85%  96%  99%  S$ issues 
Public offering  35%  15%  4%  1% 
Private placement  97%  98%  99%  100%  Non-S$ issues 
Public offering  3%  2%  1%  0% 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
. 
Table   5.4: Percentage of Issue Amounts of Unlisted Bonds 
in Issues of Nongovernment Debt Securities in Singapore (2003–07) 
2003  2004 2005 2006  2007Q1 
56%  68% 75% 67% 81% 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
 
                                                 
47The Monetary Authority of Singapore discontinued the collection of bond data on the basis of the breakdown 
between private placement and public offering in 2003. 
  36Figure   5.2: Simplification of Documentation for Frequent Issuers 
 
Euro medium-term note (MTN) programs are another popular example of 
institutional offerings. They are the most predominant and speediest way to issue fixed 
income securities in the Euro market. MTNs are said to account for approximately 60 percent 
to 90 percent of Euro fixed income issues.
48 An issue can be closed in less than a week of the 
issuer’s issuance notification. MTNs are issued on a syndicated or non-syndicated basis, 
continuously in series, through agents or dealers designated by the issuer. The issuer 
produces and maintains standardized documents, including the offering circular, for all its 
issues up to a certain aggregate amount of notes (master prospectus). Each time an issue is 
launched, its specific terms are set forth in a pricing supplement to the offering circular 
(pricing supplement) (Figure 5.2). Each issue of notes may vary in maturity (ranging from 2 
to 30 years), currency, coupon rate, size, denomination, and other features. 
5.3  Integrated Disclosure and Shelf Registration 
Integrated disclosure allows the issuer to incorporate periodic disclosure documents 
by reference in its public offering documents, thereby easing the disclosure burden of public  
                                                 
























































  37Box   5.2: Bought Deal Compared with Book Building 
The issuer’s ability to tap the market expeditiously at a propitious moment (market flexibility) 
with shelf registration has intensified underwriter competition, thus resulting in the growth of bought deals, 
as opposed to book building. 
 
A bought deal is a markedly efficient issuing method to the issuer, but it involves a large market 
risk to the investment bank. Bought deals tend to take place when the investment bank has a high degree 
of success in issue placement and deems the risk associated with the issuer or the securities to be small or 
manageable.  
 
In a bought deal, the investment bank offers the issuer a firm price or a guaranteed spread over an 
index interest rate at which to underwrite (buy) the whole issue. The issuer chooses the investment bank, 
depending mostly on the competitiveness of the price or the spread. On the issuer’s acceptance of the offer, 
the investment bank reoffers the securities to the market through a syndicate at the committed price or rate.  
 
In establishing the firm price or the guaranteed spread, the investment bank takes into account a 
range of factors. They include (a) general factors, such as the current level, volatility, and outlook for 
interest rates and the yield curve; (b) issuer-specific factors, such as the issuer’s rating, sector, and 
frequency of issuance in the particular market; (c) issue-specific factors, such as the issue size and 
structure; (d) market-specific factors, such as the supply and demand situation in the targeted group of 
investors and the placement power of prospective syndicate members; and (e) the investment bank’s own 
factors, such as its overall business relationship with the issuer and its financial position.  
 
A book-building method exposes the investment bank to less market risk; however, uncertainty to 
the issuer increases. When the issue is large or difficult or the issuer wants a greater degree of control on 
the bond’s success, the book-building method is the likely one adopted.  
 
In the book-building method, the investment bank wins from the issuer the mandate to lead an 
issue, mainly on the basis of an indicative price or rate. The investment bank’s relationship with the issuer 
and market reputation play a significant role in the issuer’s selection of the lead manager. As the lead 
manager, the investment bank pre-markets the issue through its own sales force as well as through invited 
syndicate members. On the basis of feedback from premarketing and coordination with the issuer and 
major syndicate members such as co-lead managers, the investment bank establishes a price range for the 
issue. The lead manager and the syndicate members solicit from prospective investors’ interest in the issue 
against the price range (price talk) to fill the order book (book building).  
 
The time for premarketing and price talk ranges from hours to days, depending on the issue’s 
attractiveness to investors. Analyzing demand for the issue by demand attributes, such as spread level, 
strength of interest, and type and region of investor, the lead manager prices the issue and immediately 
launches it. To establish an indicative price or rate, the investment bank considers almost the same factors 
as those for a bought deal. 
 
offerings (Figure 1.1 and Table 5.1). Every issuer with publicly offered securities outstanding 
continues to disclose periodically by filing reports with the regulator, such as quarterly, 
semiannual, and annual financial statements. In addition, the regulation in most countries 
requires the issuer to disclose material events promptly and file reports on them with the 
regulator. Then the qualified issuer is allowed to file these disclosure documents for a new 
public offering by incorporating periodic disclosure documents by reference. Offering and 
  38periodic disclosure documents are substantially redundant, though their objectives are 
different. Integrated disclosure minimizes the redundancies.  
Integrated disclosure has brought about shelf registration in the U.S. market. The 
issuer files a registration statement (base prospectus) for an anticipated public offering or 
offerings with the SEC for review and approval. The prospectus remains effective for two 
years. Seasoned reporting issuers, including those issuing non-convertible debt securities 
with an investment grade rating,
49 are not required to file a post-effective amendment. At a 
takedown, the issuer files a prospectus supplement with the SEC. The supplement contains 
the terms of the new securities, the underwriting arrangements, and all material changes in 
the issuer’s affairs. The qualified issuer may incorporate the material changes by reference to 
periodic reports by means of a statement to that effect in the supplement.
50 The SEC does not 
usually review the supplement. Therefore, shelf registration allows the issuer to tap the 
market expeditiously at a propitious moment (market flexibility), thereby intensifying 
underwriter competition and resulting in the growth of bought deals (Box 5.2).  
The EU introduced a system equivalent to shelf registration by means of the 
Prospectus Directive in 2003.
51 The new system for registration of documents allows the 
publication of the prospectus as a set of disclosure documents instead of as a single 
prospectus document. A prospectus is split into a Registration Document, a Securities Note 
and a Summary Note – each of which may circulate separately. The Registration Document 
contains the information related to the issuer, and is updated yearly. The Securities Note 
contains the information related to the specific securities issued and is produced at the time 
of the issuance. The Summary Note contains a résumé of the two documents and the risk 
warning. The disclosure is complemented by incorporation by reference. This system 
                                                 
49 I. Eligibility Requirement for Use of Form S-3, General Instructions, Form S-3. Seasoned issuers with a good 
track record in periodically filing all reports are eligible for Form S-3. 
50 Items 11 and 12 of Form S-3.  
51 Institutional offerings remain dominant, however, apparently satisfying debt financing needs in the market. 
Although the Prospectus Directive was intended to foster cross-border public offers through a passport 
mechanism in the European Economic Area (EEA), incompletely harmonized disclosure regimes across the 
EEA continue to inhibit the development of a single public offering market. As a result, the choice for the issuer 
is effectively between public offerings in a single country or a few selected countries and institutional offerings. 
(Craven 2007, Petr 2007a). 
  39apparently is based on an MTN program in the Eurobond market and may also be viewed as 
an evolution of shelf-registration in the U.S. market (Figure 5.2). 
Integrated disclosure and shelf registration may serve as an incentive for better 
periodic disclosure in emerging markets where the regulator can demonstrate their benefits. 
Criteria for being eligible for integrated disclosure and shelf registration may include the 
issuer’s flawless reporting record and corporate governance as well as the issuer’s size and 
the quality and type of securities offered. Consequently, shelf registration is likely to serve 
seasoned, large, listed, and frequent issuers (for example, utility companies, financial 
institutions, and foreign governments) well. Preconditions for adopting shelf registration 
would include a well-organized report filing system at the regulatory agency and an adequate 
and credible market following of shelf registration issuers in the private sector. Periodic 
reports should be easily accessible to the public. The market should have intermediaries and 
analysts regularly researching shelf registration issuers.  
Integrated disclosure may complicate a liability issue in disclosure, while shelf 
registration may fail in due diligence. In the U.S. market, the issuer’s defense against liability 
for material misrepresentation or omission in offering disclosure is harder than in periodic 
disclosure. Integrated disclosure, together with real-time disclosure, would expose the issuer 
to more liability in filing periodic reports than nonintegrated disclosure, potentially chilling 
disclosure practice (Martin and Robinson 2003). Emerging markets are also likely to 
differentiate liability for material misrepresentation or omission in disclosure between 
offering documents and periodic reports because the motivation behind them could be 
significantly different.
52 Meanwhile, the net effect of shelf registration has been debatable. 
Shelf registration has enhanced underwriting competition but has reduced the underwriter’s 
ability to conduct thorough due diligence (Allen, Lamy, and Thompson 1990; Blackwell, 
Marr, and Spivey 1990; Choi and Gulati 2006; Fox 1984; Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson 
1984, 1987).  
                                                 
52 The Indian market has different liability regimes for offering and continuous disclosures (Parekh 2005). 
  406.  Conclusion 
Broadening the offering methods for corporate bonds would help invigorate corporate 
bond market development in emerging markets. Primary market efficiency significantly 
determines the activity level of a corporate bond market. Aligning disclosure requirements 
with an actual investor profile would help reduce the issuing costs of corporate bonds 
substantially. The core investor base for corporate bonds is normally non-retail investors. 
Nonetheless, the regulatory focus of corporate bond issuance has inappropriately been placed 
on protecting the public in many emerging markets. The indiscriminate approach represented 
by a public offer filing may have disconnected corporate bond issuers and investors in 
emerging economies. Instead, the regulator can differentiate the degree of investor protection 
by type of investors to reach the core investor base of corporate bonds effectively.  
The most critical cost element in a stand-alone public offering could be the 
uncontrollable opportunity costs in complying with disclosure requirements. The issuing cost 
model presented in this paper implies some of the borrower’s behavior. First, good prospects 
for the project may discourage the borrower from a public bond issue. Second, the 
uncertainty of the ultimate opportunity cost may turn the borrower toward a bank loan, 
whose cost is relatively certain. The pre-launch period may become infinite or extremely 
long, should the borrower miss a market window for the bond issue. Third, the borrower’s 
choice between a bond issue and a bank loan could be highly sensitive to the length of the 
pre-launch period.  
The issuer often finds traditional private placements advantageous because of their 
low issuing costs, speediness, confidentiality, and re-negotiability. Furthermore, traditional 
private placements can play a significant role in emerging economies. Their expeditious and 
relatively predictable issuing process may be of great value to issuers by significantly 
reducing opportunity costs. Their market can serve as a testing ground for products new to an 
emerging market. They allow debt products to meet the issuer’s needs flexibly in the absence 
or dearth of cash management and hedging instruments in emerging markets. They help 
circumvent the underdeveloped retail distribution network. They also appear amenable to 
Islamic requirements for a debt-like obligation. Traditional private placements will enable 
SMEs or unlisted closed companies, such as family-owned companies, to access debt 
investors directly. 
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The regulatory framework for traditional private placements needs to satisfy three key 
elements: exemption, clarity, and protection. Exemption is aimed at minimizing or 
eliminating the issuer’s and the intermediary’s liability under the public offering rules. The 
exemption rules need to be so clear that the issuer or the intermediary, by acting on the rules, 
may comfortably place bonds without prior clearance from the regulator. In traditional 
private placements, the regulator protects the public by imposing restrictions on placement 
and transfer of bonds rather than by enforcing disclosure.  
Institutional offerings commonly refer to private placements made to specified types 
of institutions and other investors (qualified investors) that are readily resalable between 
qualified investors. Qualified investors generally include banks, brokers, dealers, pension 
funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds. Institutional offerings would conveniently 
meet the debt financing needs of well-established but unlisted companies and foreign 
governments and companies. Some unlisted state-owned enterprises with no exempt security 
status and some listed but infrequent issuers also are likely to use an institutional offering 
facility. 
Integrated disclosure allows the issuer to incorporate by reference into its public 
offering documents periodic disclosure documents, thereby easing the disclosure burden of 
public offerings. Integrated disclosure has brought about shelf registration. Integrated 
disclosure or shelf registration may serve as an incentive to better periodic disclosure in 
emerging markets when the regulator can demonstrate their benefits. Preconditions for 
adopting shelf registration would include a well-organized report filing system at the 
regulatory agency and an adequate and credible market following of shelf registration issuers 
in the private sector. Integrated disclosure may complicate a liability issue in disclosure, 
while shelf registration may fail in due diligence. Shelf registration facilitated by integrated 
disclosure is likely to serve seasoned, large, listed, and frequent issuers (for example, utility 
companies, financial institutions, and foreign governments) well.   
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